In Colombia, the war was stalled at a much lower level of conflict when negotiations with the leftist guerrillas began, and the basic trends for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were headed downward. troop presence helps bring a desirable peace deal - “desirable” defined as a Colombia-like deal, with minimal political representation for the Taliban in national and subnational government, an amnesty, and fighter demobilization and reintegration assistance. There is no credible path whereby a sustained U.S. It is on a path to become the strongest political force in Afghanistan, and a powerful actor in a future Afghan government.īy Vanda Felbab-Brown, Harold Trinkunas, and Shadi Hamid 2017Ĭontinuing the U.S. For several years, the Taliban has been steadily ascendant on the battlefield. The United States hasn’t achieved its goal of defeating the Taliban. Special Operation Forces, top leadership attention, and financial resources to counter those threats can deliver far greater strategic benefits than perpetuating the Afghanistan military effort. Now, threats from China, an aggressive Russia, North Korea, and Iran - as well as zoonotic pandemics - are more important strategic priorities. Afghanistan policy in isolation from other issues and strategic priorities to date, the tyranny of sunk costs has inflated Afghanistan’s importance. Indeed, another wise aspect of the Biden administration’s decision was to stop treating U.S. That possibility needs to be weighed against other already materialized strategic threats and realities. That specter has been a key justification for militarily staying on and on. The Biden administration’s political courage lies in its refusal to be cowed by the possibility that a terrorism threat will grow in Afghanistan after the U.S. military engagements abroad, the United States is taking a step in addressing this important danger. veterans of such frustrating unending wars are an important source of right-wing armed recruitment in the United States and the threat to public safety, democracy, and rule of law those groups pose here. policy should be geared toward this objectives through diplomacy, conditional aid and sanctions, and, even, possibly occasional strikes from off-shore. Though hopefully the U.S.-Taliban Doha agreement from February 2020 will incentivize the Taliban to prevent al-Qaida from taking actions against the United States and its allies from Afghanistan, and ongoing U.S. Thus, even though the Taliban is unwilling to sever its connections with al-Qaida, that threat is not radically different from the terrorist threats against the United States and our allies emanating from other locales. Various al-Qaida and ISIS affiliates robustly operate in Mali and other parts of the Sahel and North Africa. The Islamic State (ISIS) in Somalia, while much weaker than al-Shabab, retains persistent capacity. In Somalia, for example, al-Shabab’s territorial and governing power are steadily increasing and the group retains a strong allegiance to al-Qaida. The Biden administration correctly assessed that the threat of terrorism from Afghanistan today is in fact smaller than from various parts of Africa and the Middle East. While the Taliban too is implicated in many illicit economies, it is often seen as less predatory and capricious, even if brutal and restrictive, than powerbrokers associated with the Afghan government. However, perpetually bad governance in Afghanistan has undermined stability and allowed the Taliban to entrench itself. The Islamic State in Khorasan (ISK) continues to operate in Afghanistan, but the Taliban has been fighting ISK assiduously. That basic goal was accomplished a decade ago: Al-Qaida’s capabilities are a fraction of what they used to be. primary objective in Afghanistan since 2001 has been to degrade the threat of terrorism against the United States and its allies. Even so, the administration made some serious tactical mistakes in its announcement.
military, financial, diplomatic, and leadership resources would be better spent on other issues. military engagement would not reverse these dynamics and that U.S. The basic wisdom of the administration’s decision is the realization that perpetuating U.S.